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Decoding Turkey’s Lust for Regional Clout in the Middle East: 





This essay examines the domestic and external roots of Turkey’s activism in the Middle East 
through the lens of role theory. Within this context, the essay falls into three sections. In the first part, 
the conceptual tools that are going to be used in decoding the roots of Turkish activism will be 
examined. The second section will discuss the national role conceptions of Turkish foreign policy elites 
for the Middle East, while the third section will examine the expectations of external actors about 
Turkey’s role in the region. In the empirical sections of the essay, the methodology will involve a close 
examination of both Turkish foreign policy elites’ and external actors’ speeches, which are assumed to 
deliver cues about Turkey’s role conceptions in the Middle East. 
 






This essay examines the domestic and external roots of Turkey’s activism in the Middle 
East through the lens of role theory. Within this context, the essay falls into three sections. In 
the first part, the conceptual tools that are going to be used in decoding the roots of Turkish 
activism will be examined. The second section will discuss the national role conceptions of 
Turkish foreign policy elites for the Middle East, while the third section will examine the 
expectations of external actors about Turkey’s role in the region. In the empirical sections of 
the essay, the methodology will involve a close examination of both Turkish foreign policy 
elites’ and external actors’ speeches, which are assumed to deliver cues about their ideas on 
the roles that Turkey should play.  
What makes the Turkish case suitable for a role theory based analysis is the fact that 
Turkish foreign policy has recently undergone significant changes, and such a doctrinal and 
practical shift has led to a considerable degree of foreign policy activism, most notably in the 
Middle East, which has never been seen throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. 
Although this remarkable change is mostly ascribed to the foreign policy visions of Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)’s leading cadres (Aras, 2009; Aktay, 2010), to date, only a few 
studies attempted to incorporate a particular theoretical approach to explain this identity 
related shift.  
The application of role theory to foreign policy analysis (FPA) has offered new venues 
for researchers. While FPA introduced actor-based approaches to explain the foreign policy 
behaviours of states by looking below the nation state level, 1  its overemphasis on the 
cognitive dimension of foreign policy making, remains vague without an operational and 
descriptive framework. If the national identity is assumed to be a determinant of the foreign 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive study on the history of actor specific theoretical development in foreign policy 
analysis, see Valerie M. Hudson (2005:1-30). 
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policy, role theory, by arguing that the unique characteristics of each society and elite 
influence the construction of the self, self-related roles and the performance of these relevant 
roles (Aggestam, 2006:21-22), reveals the linkage between national identity and foreign 
policy behaviours. In this respect, the questions of ‘who we are?’ and ‘how are we perceived 
by others?’ (Kaarboo, 2003:159) that are raised by role theory, brought identity to the fore of 
FPA literature even before the appearance of social constructivist theories.2 In the following 
section, the conceptual tools provided by role theory will be discussed in order to decode the 





Role theory has been inspired by sociological and psychological approaches about the 
roles that individuals perform in a social environment (Sekhri, 2009:425). The conceptual 
abundance of role theory offers an extensive and productive framework for categorizing and 
explaining the foreign policy behaviours of states (Thies, 2009). As Walker (1987:2) argues, 
the descriptive value of role theory in foreign policy analysis stems from its rich conceptual 
framework, which provides the researchers with images to focus on different types of 
analysis from state level to individual level. However, for the purpose of this paper, I will 
mainly focus on five concepts provided by the role theory to examine the underlying causes 
of Turkey’s foreign policy activism and its possible consequences in the Middle East. These 
concepts are national role conception, role prescription/expectation, role performance, role 
conflict, and role maker. 
In the foreign policy analysis literature, after K.J. Holsti first coined the term ‘national 
role conception’ in 1970 to unveil the domestic roots of particular foreign policy preferences, 
the approach gradually gained disciplinary acknowledgment. 3  In his own words, Holsti 
(1970:245-246) defines national role conception as: 
 
the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and 
actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a 
continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. It is their 
‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external 
environment. 
 
Similarly, thirty years after Holsti’s initial work, Krotz (2002:6) defined the national role 
conception as “domestically shared views and understandings regarding the proper role and 
purpose of one’s own state as a social collectivity in the international arena.” In this respect, 
national role conception refers to foreign policy elite’s domestic construction of the national-
self and self-related roles that a nation is assumed to perform. 
The domestic context of national self-construction is vital in grasping the factors that 
shape elite perceptions about the roles of their nations since ‘the answer to the question of 
who are enemies and friends begins at home’ (Hopf, 2002:294). In other words, domestic 
                                                          
2  For an analysis on constructivism’s premises borrowed from role theory see Marijke Breuning 
(2011:20-23).  
3 For studies on the nexus between role theory and foreign policy analysis see Wish (1980), Herrmann 
(1985; 1986), Walker (1987; 1992), Grossman (2005). 





national self-construction, with its special reference to external others, constitutes ‘who and 
what “we” are, who and what “our enemies” are, in what ways “we” are threatened by 
“them” and how “we” might best deal with those threats’ (Weldes, 1996:283). In this regard, 
the cognitive process that is to shape national self and the external other is a product of 
history, culture and shared experiences of the nation.  
The international context of the national role conception also has a decisive impact on 
decision makers’ construction of the national self through a continuous interaction in which 
states take feedback. For Holsti (1970:246), foreign policy behaviours of a state are 
determined not only by domestically self-constructed perceptions but also by the 
expectations of others, which he names as ‘role prescriptions’. In this regard, the term ‘role 
prescriptions’, refers to the expectations of international actors generating certain types of 
behaviours for the particular state under consideration. The process in which role beholders 
socialize or learn4 the expectations of others is vital in formulating or transforming the 
national identity and identity driven interests.  
Related with the internal and external contexts of identity and role conception, change in 
role performances or behavioural change in terms of foreign policy should also be examined. 
If role performance is the actual policy behaviour of the states in a general social context 
(Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012:94), how do the internal and external contexts stimulate 
change in a state’s roles and related policy preferences? The answer of this question should 
begin with an assumption that identities and roles are not static and subject to change 
depending on the conjunctural developments taking place in internal and external contexts.  
In terms of domestic context, revolutions, regime changes, military coups or legal 
governmental changes may all result in a significant observable shift in a state’s role 
conceptions, due to the new group’s perceptions about their nation and the roles attached to 
this new status. In terms of external context, as a result of interaction with the external others, 
changes in the roles, identities and policy preferences can take place through adaptation 
which means ‘changes in strategies and instruments in performing roles’ (Breuning, 
2011:30). On the other hand, such a change can also take place through the elite learning of 
new beliefs, norms and values that necessitates profound changes in the constituent parts of 
national identity such as the transformation of beliefs, norms and values of the relevant state 
(Harnisch 2011:10). 
The concept of role conflict does also have an explanatory and operational value when 
roles become incompatible with each other at a certain stage of policy formulation and role 
performance. Holsti (1970:277) argues that foreign policy makers can adopt multiple roles in 
divergent international environs and on various issue areas, and that these issues and contexts 
may force states to adopt divergent and overlapping roles. That is, in performing different 
roles, a state may be confronted with conflicts that can impel its elites either to reconsider the 
country’s foreign policy roles or prefer one or more than one of them at the expense of others. 
Finally, yet importantly, is the concept of role maker, which raises the question of who 
describes and determines roles domestically. In FPA, role makers are assumed to be decision 
makers or elites that formulate and determine the roles that a state should play in dealing 
with its external environment. The main rationale behind this assumption is that, first, roles 
are considered as intersubjective and therefore shared by the rest of the society, and second, 
even if there has not been a consensus on the roles that the nation should play, foreign policy 
decisions are only taken by the elites (Cantır and Kaarboo, 2012:7).  
                                                          
4 For “state socialization” and “learning” concepts, see Thies (2010) and Harnisch (2012). 
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Although role theory prioritizes elites as role makers, ‘societal expectations as to what the 
national role should be may diverge from elite expectations or those of decision makers’ 
(Harnisch, 2012:50). This process also addresses a domestic contest between the perceptions 
of different societal groups regarding the constitutive elements of national identity, a process 
that can promote consensus or cause conflict. Accordingly, domestic intercultural and 
political encounters may either create a shared understanding of the national roles (Cantır 
and Kaarboo, 2012:9), which would not only justify the pursuit of foreign policies attached 
to a particular status but also provide legitimacy for the actual foreign policy behaviour or 
may display the dominance of a particular group concerning identity formation and related 
role conceptions at the expense of others. 
Within the context of abovementioned conceptual framework, I have three assumptions 
that may have operational and explanatory value for the Turkish case. First, although 
nongovernmental organizations, networks, mass media, think thanks and public opinion 
seem to be influential in the foreign policy domain under AKP, national role conceptions and 
related policy outputs are mainly formulated by the AKP’s elites. AKP’s electoral victories 
in 2002, 2007 and 2011 as well as the public opinion polls on certain foreign policy issues 
display that elite conceptions and formulations are also shared by the masses. Second, even 
though I will borrow Holti’s role conceptions to explain Turkish activism in the Middle East, 
I argue that a new categorization of national role conceptions and a unique wording are vital 
to decode Turkish foreign policy. In this regard, I suggest ‘regional leader’ as the main role 
conception and ‘regional protector’, ‘defender of Islam’, ‘mediator’, ‘model’, ‘bridge’ and 
‘liberalizer’ roles as the supplementary roles, which all require a considerable degree of 
activism. Third, contrary to Holsti’s underestimation of the influence of external actors on 
national role conceptions, because of the states’ sensitivity on their sovereignty, I argue that 
external actors’ role prescriptions are as influential in shaping Turkey’s national role 
conceptions as elites’ perception of the Turkish national self.  
 
 
TURKEY’S NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
The peculiarity of AKP in Turkish foreign policy lies in its determination to embrace a 
new role for Turkey. This represents a rupture with the past, since the foundational claim of 
AKP’s foreign policy doctrine includes a critique of Kemalism,5 which for the leading cadres 
of AKP, culminated in an unquestioning western orientation in Turkish foreign policy. Thus, 
explaining the transformation in the national role conception of Turkey during the AKP 
period first requires an examination of Kemalist principles as the guidelines of the so-called 
traditional foreign policy to find out to what extent AKP’s foreign policy vision and its new 
role conception represents a rupture with it. 
                                                          
5 Kemalism refers to the ideology of the followers of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the 
Turkish Republic. His six principles (republicanism, nationalism, populism, revolutionism, secularism 
and etatism) constitute the ideational ideological core of Kemalism. Nevertheless, according to some 
authors, “Kemalism did not really represent a system of ideas, but was more a political practice aimed 
at placing the new Turkey into the orbit of reform and progress in a completely pragmatic manner”, a 
political practice carried out by the secularist (military and civilian) bureaucratic elites (Dumont, 
1984). 





The foreign policy conceptions of the Kemalist elites who founded the Turkish Republic 
in 1923 have been heavily influenced by the experiences of western interventionism from the 
Tanzimat period (1839-1876) onwards. The intentions of western powers to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire developed as a clear pattern during the nineteenth 
century, eventually resulting in the occupation of the empire’s heartland of Anatolia in 1918. 
However, even such a negative influence did not lead to the construction of a reactionary 
anti-western identity, since the Kemalist elites believed that the underlying cause of 
disintegration of the empire was its failure to realize a western model of modernization. 
Hence, the Kemalist elites initiated their modernization project, not only in terms of 
industrial development but also within a broader socio-cultural and political context. Such an 
effort had far-reaching and profound consequences in foreign policy, generating non-
irredentist nationalism, republicanism and secularism as the main pillars of Kemalist foreign 
policy. Thus, despite its memories of the First World War, Turkey identified itself with the 
western world vis-à-vis the Muslim communities of the Middle East.   
The worries of the Kemalist elite concerning the territorial integrity of the newly founded 
Turkish Republic were first exacerbated by the instabilities of the 1930s and the Second 
World War, and then further intensified by the Cold War. Accordingly, they viewed 
integration with the political, economic and military alliances of the West as vital for 
survival under Cold War circumstances, even though such an orientation further distanced 
the country from the Middle East. Yet, it is noteworthy to mention that the pre-AKP period is 
not displaying uniform characteristics. Turkey’s isolation over its Cyprus intervention and 
the economic necessities that surfaced after the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) crisis (Akder, 1987:566) culminated in a policy shift towards the Arab-
Muslim world. After 1974, whereas Turkey’s ties with its Arab-Muslim neighbours have 
been strengthened, the country’s relations with Israel ‘grew colder’ and became ‘nearly 
meaningless’ by the late 1970s (Liel, 2001:6). Turkey’s reduction of the country’s diplomatic 
representation in Tel-Aviv to chargé d'affaires level in the wake of Sinai War of 1956, its 
condemnation of Israeli gains after the Six Day Wars of 1967, its vote in favour of the 
United Nations General Assembly’s Resolution 3379 describing Zionism as a form of racism 
(Fırat, Kürkçüoğlu, 2003:795), the opening of a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 
office in Ankara on August 15, 1979 and its further reduction of Turkey’s diplomatic 
representation to the level of second secretary in 1980, following the Israeli Parliament’s 
(Knesset) decision to declare Jerusalem as the capital city were all the outcomes of Turkey’s 
policy shifts towards the Arab-Muslim world. 
Turkey’s volatile relations with the Arab-Muslim world between 1980 and 2000 have 
been marked with distinct ups and downs. During his tenure, Turgut Özal invested in Islam 
‘as a foreign policy instrument’ and ‘established cordial relations with the Islamic world, 
particularly with Middle Eastern countries’ (Aral, 2001:76). In Laçiner’s words, (Laçiner, 
2003:175) ‘Özal attached great importance to the Middle Eastern Muslim countries’ and 
‘improved Turkey’s economic relations with Iran, Iraq, Libya and Pakistan, which had been 
neglected for a long time.  
Between 1991 and 1993 Demirel and Çiller governments pursued a carefully balanced 
policy towards Arab-Muslim world and Israel (Özcan, 2005:49-51). In the aftermath of 1995 
elections a new coalition government was established,6 and during the new government’s 
                                                          
6 Refahyol government was established with True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP) and Welfare 
Party (Refah Partisi-RP). 
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tenure Islam became prominent in Turkish foreign policy, particularly with the efforts of 
Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of RP and a hawkish critic of Israel (Ovalı, 2012:41) 
(Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003:157). The post-modern military intervention that took place on 
February 28, 1997 overthrew the coalition government and this event had significant 
repercussions on Turkey’s foreign policy formulations towards the Arab-Muslim world. The 
new coalition government7 formed on June 30, 1997 under the leadership of Bülent Ecevit, 
preferred to strengthen the country’s ties with Israel but did not distance itself from the 
Muslim cause to the extent that even Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, a left wing politician, 
accused Israel of carrying out genocide in Palestine after Israeli attacks on civilians residing 
in Jenin refugee camp in 2002. 
What makes the AKP period distinctive in Turkish foreign policy history is the party 
elite’s foundational claims that represent a rupture with Turkey’s traditional role conceptions 
hitherto been constructed by the Kemalist elites. This difference between AKP’s and the 
Kemalist elites’ national role conceptions becomes more profound when Turkey’s 
increasingly intense engagement in Middle Eastern affairs and its subsequent confrontation 
with Israel are considered. In this regard, it would be meaningful to begin with the ideology 
of AKP which encompasses the essential ingredients of the new Turkish self and related 
foreign policy principles. 
Despite the Islamic background of its echelons, AKP was established with a claim of 
‘occupying the centre-right position on the Turkish political spectrum’ (Kardaş, 2010:118). 
That center-right position was redefined by the party in its attempt to popularize a novel 
ideological stand, which itself named it as conservative democracy. Though the party's 
policies between 2002 and 2007 is thought to serve to the liberalization of the Turkish polity 
under the guise of the EU (European Union), as it is claimed by the leading figures of AKP, 
the major ideological pillar of the party has always been conservatism in a new mould. In 
terms of foreign policy, unlike their predecessor RP, AKP has formulated and pursued a pro-
Western foreign policy. Nevertheless, their Islamist conservative ideology has caused Islam 
to emerge as a significant asset of their foreign policy. In this regard, since the very early 
days of their government, Middle East and the Palestinian question to which Islamists have 
always been sensitive has been the centrepiece of AKP’s foreign policy agenda.  
In the foreign policy domain, AKP first engaged in a re-formulation of Turkish national 
identity and then diminished the role of the Kemalist military and secular elites, which had 
previously been influential in the foreign policy making process. In this regard, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009:91) argued that Turkish society has been and still is 
in a ‘struggle of redefining itself’, which he interpreted as a natural consequence of the 
discrepancies between the Kemalist elite’s and society’s interpretations of what constitutes 
Turkish national identity. In Davutoğlu’s lexicon, the term ‘redefining’ refers to the societal 
reformulation of Turkish identity based on Islamic-Ottoman culture and related foreign 
policy preferences, previously ignored by secular elites. For him, in order to cope with the 
challenges of globalism, it is necessary to construct a link between local and national 
identities (Justice and Development Party Press Release, 2012). 
Similarly, Aras and Görener (2010:78-79) described the discrepancies between Kemalist 
and Islamist interpretations of Turkish identity as the weakness of Kemalist identity politics 
and criticized its reflections in Turkish foreign policy as follows: ‘The republican elite, who 
                                                          
7 The new government was named as ANASOL-D, with Motherland Party (ANAP), Democratic Left 
Party (DSP) and Democrat Party (DP). 





were granted a privileged role in the formulation of foreign policy, have strongly held onto a 
Western-oriented, isolationist and passive foreign policy stand, while effectively excluding 
mass society from constructing alternative role conceptions’.  
Davutoğlu’s (2009:91) second point of criticism of Kemalist identity politics is based on 
the unidimensional character of it, namely Westernism, which for him had prevented Turkey 
from responding to changes in its surrounding environment for more than 70 years. For him 
(Davutoğlu, 2008:78), such a unidimensional perspective has generated a peripheral role for 
Turkey, which could only be transcended through embracing multiple regional identities 
emanating from Turkey’s unique geographical, cultural and historical background. From the 
early days of AKP government, Davutoğlu’s foreign policy vision has found considerable 
resonance among AKP’s foreign policy elites (Murison, 2006) and resulted in intense efforts 
to introduce new roles for Turkey. 
As the current primary role conception, Turkey’s role as a regional leader should be 
scrutinized first. The term ‘regional leader’ refers to a government’s self-perception of 
leadership, which requires duties and responsibilities for a specific geographic location 
(Holsti, 1970:261). Regional leader role addresses two constitutive elements of the new 
Turkish identity that necessitated activism in the Middle East. First, the Ottoman imperial 
heritage as the protector of the Holy Lands is a vital component of Islamist identity and it 
serves as a stimulus for AKP to embrace leadership in the region. Second, the self-
confidence stemming from the country’s economic and political stability under AKP is 
another one that encouraged Turkish activism. PM Tayyip Erdoğan and Davutoğlu’s words 
reflect both of these elements; 
 
We cannot turn our back on Palestine, Palestinians and Gaza. They are asking us, ‘What is 
Turkey doing in Palestine?’ They are asking us, ‘What is the reason behind Turkey’s growing 
interest in the Palestinian cause?’ ... They are not aware of the responsibility that we have to 
take on, and this responsibility has been granted to us by Turkish history and by the will of the 
Turkish people (Yeni Şafak, 2010). 
 
Our economic interests also shape our foreign policy. Turkey has a big population, young 
people constituting half of it, and a vibrant economy, striving to be among the top ten 
economies of the world by 2023, which is the one hundredth anniversary of the Turkish 
Republic. Additionally, the Turkish private sector is very active and has a strong 
entrepreneurial spirit. This requires us to widen the scope of our outreach as an economic actor  
(MacLeod, 2011).  
 
Second, Turkish foreign policy elites embrace a “regional protector role” in the Middle 
East. This role supports the regional leader role in the sense that ‘it places emphasis on the 
functioning of providing protection for adjacent regions’ (Holsti, 1970:262). Since role 
theory attributes significance to the question of ‘how are we perceived by others’, Turkey’s 
ambition to generate regional protector role can be considered AKP’s elites’ concerns to 
restore country’s Cold War image as a collaborator of western powers. This national role 
conception takes on greater significance in light of AKP Vice President Ömer Çelik’s 
statement:  
 
Turkey is not as constrained as it was in the past, when a national cause was defined within 
territorial limits. … Today, Turkey has the capacity to identify issues beyond its borders as a 
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national cause. Compared to the static behaviour of previous governments, even on the most 
well-known national causes, such an understanding and transformation of foreign policy is a 
revolution. Thus, our prime minister has declared Gaza as a national cause (Aksoy, 2011). 
 
The third role that I suggest for Turkey is that of ‘liberalizer’ that refers to the intense 
efforts to export liberal values to the Middle East as a country reconciling neo-liberal 
economic system and democracy. Understood as such, Turkey’s investments for the 
promotion of liberal values such as democracy, gender equality, transparency and 
accountability become more meaningful, as can be seen from President Abdullah Gül’s 
speech, addressing the foreign ministers of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). 
 
We must act with a refreshed vision – a vision in which good governance, transparency and 
accountability will reign, the fundamental rights and freedoms as well as gender equality are 
upheld, and there would be no place for blunting rhetoric and slogans. In short, we should first 
put our house in order. Rational thinking should be our driving force, as we draw our strength 
from our spiritual values (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, Press Release 2003a). 
 
Gül’s addressing of the need to build a wider liberal community in the Middle East took 
on greater significance when Erdoğan advised the Egyptians to draft and adopt a secular 
constitution in the post-revolutionary transition period (Radikal, 2011).  
Turkey’s liberalizer role became more prominent in Turkey’s support for societal 
demands since the outset of the Arab Spring. Addressing the AKP group in the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly, Erdoğan declared Turkey’s desire and support for a peaceful 
transition to democracy in Syria: 
 
We had a friendship that began nine years ago but Syria failed to appreciate this. They [Syrian 
rulers] did not pay heed to our warnings… But we cannot remain silent in the face of this 
process. We will continue to display the necessary stance. I believe that the Syrian people will 
be successful in their glorious resistance (Today’s Zaman, 2011). 
 
Similarly Davutoğlu stresses the mission that Turkey has undertook as a liberalizer by 
claiming that, ‘Turkish foreign policy is guided by our democratic values as well as our 
interests. This can best be seen in our support for reform efforts in the Middle East and North 
Africa’ (MacLeod, 2011). 
The fourth component of Turkey’s new national role conception is the ‘model role’8 that 
refers to the presentation of a state’s economic and political achievements as a model to be 
emulated by others with an aim to increase influence and prestige. Even though Davutoğlu 
argues that ‘Turkey does not have a claim to offer a model for the Middle East’ (Gürsel, 
2011), this role conception is becoming visible in the foreign policy discourse of foreign 
policy elites. However, in order to refrain from imperialistic connotations of the term 
‘model’, with a careful wording, the concept has been modified to the term ‘source of 
inspiration’.    
                                                          
8 Due to the current “Turkish model for the Arab Muslim world” debates, the model role is used as 
similar to Holsti’s example role which refers to “the importance of promoting prestige and gaining 
influence in the international system by pursuing certain domestic policies” (Holsti, 1970:268). 





Turkish foreign policy elites have embraced model role with a special emphasis on the 
country’s economic and political system that has successfully managed to reconcile Islam 
and democracy, previously considered as incompatible value systems. The following excerpt 
reveals Gül’s inclination in as early as 2003 to introduce the so-called Turkish model to the 
Arab-Muslim world, and hints at Turkey’s eagerness to embrace the model role. 
 
I challenge the view that modernity and democracy based on the rule of law, political and 
economic participation, and gender equality cannot exist in the Muslim world. The Turkish 
experience proves otherwise…We have chosen integration with the world rather than isolation 
and reclusion; cooperation in place of confrontation; reform instead of inertia (Presidency of 
the Republic of Turkey, Press Release 2003b). 
 
Gül’s presentation of the Turkish model thus offers a road map for other Muslim countries to 
achieve their domestic development through imitating the Turkish experience.  
The fifth role that Turkey is assumed to perform is the ‘bridge role’. The role refers to 
‘communication function, that is, acting as a “translator” or conveyor of messages and 
information between peoples of different cultures’ (Holsti, 1970:268), and Turkey’s attempts 
to found an “Alliance of Civilizations Forum” in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks 
fall into this category.  
Fethullah Gülen, a moderate Islamist leader, first coined such a role conception when he 
met with Pope John Paul II to initiate an interfaith dialogue process in 1998, and this 
initiative seemed likely to inspire ruling AKP as well. Tayyip Erdoğan’s later statements on 
the role of Istanbul in discrediting the clash of civilizations rhetoric also deserve attention in 
understanding the bridge role embraced by AKP’s elites. In addressing the Second Forum of 
the Alliance of Civilizations, he presented Turkey as the initiator of a dialogue process 
between the Christian and Muslim worlds:  
 
Istanbul brings Europe and Asia together. Istanbul is the intersection of Europe, Asia and 
Africa. However, more importantly, Istanbul is a melting pot for different cultures, civilizations, 
races, religions and languages, and holds a righteous position in the world for that…In this age, 
where the communication spreads swiftly and the whole world has turned into a small village, 
our motto is we cannot let societies have inadequate information on one another or have false 
or biased opinions on one another (UNOAC, 2009). 
 
While Erdoğan gives emphasis to Turkey’s contribution as a bridge to a process of 
dialogue between the East and West, in the meantime he designates “defender of Islam” role 
for Turkey concerning the Middle East. The sixth role, ‘defender of Islam’9, requires a role 
performance of the protection of Islamic value system from outside attacks. Erdoğan’s 
statement claiming that ‘We did not imitate the arts and sciences of the West but 
unfortunately its immorality’ (Radikal, 2008) represents such a conservative reflex to 
Western value system, and underlines the foundational claim of conservatives, whose 
                                                          
9  This role conception is used similarly with Holsti’s defender of the faith role, which refers to 
“defending value systems from attack and undertaking special responsibilities to guarantee ideological 
purity for a group of states” (Holsti, 1970:264). However, for the Turkish case it has been modified as 
“defender of Islam”.  
 ŞEVKET OVALI 10 
 
primary task has been to adopt a Western model of industrial development, but without 
eroding the values that they believe hold Muslim societies together.  
AKP’s claim of ideological purity has allowed Turkey to adopt the role of defender of 
Islam. This role conception can be clearly seen in Turkey’s desire to speak on behalf of the 
Palestinians and in its subsequent confrontation with Israel. Interestingly, this role has also 
become instrumental in discrediting the Turco-sceptic behaviours of the EU. For instance, 
Ali Babacan, former Chief Negotiator with EU, argued that Muslims were looking at the 
EU’s attitude to see whether it would allow Turkey to become a full member of the Union or 
not, and he added: 
 
We always thought the EU is a big peace project ... but then the enlargement process literally 
stalled. The open-door policy is no longer there… Moreover, one of the big themes about why 
Turkey cannot become a member of the European Union is because it is a Christian club. This 
is in our view very, very dangerous… Everyone is looking at what is going on. And what kind 
of Europe, what kind of European Union we are going to be seeing in the future is going to be 
of immense importance in terms of what kind of message our region gets (Hürriyet Daily News, 
2011). 
 
Babacan’s inclination to associate Turkey’s membership with expectations in the Muslim 
world demonstrates the fact that, even though the EU did not voice such concerns explicitly, 
Turkey assumes a defender of Islam role both by representing itself as the representative of 
the Muslim world in Europe and by highlighting its religious uniqueness in a broad 
organization characterized by an overwhelming Christian majority. Similar concerns were 
expressed by Erdoğan when he claimed that ‘Turkey’s future does not depend on EU 
membership, but the future of Christianity and Islam does’ (Financial Times, 2005). 
The seventh role that Turkey is assumed to perform is the ‘mediator’ role. Since the role 
refers to ‘fulfilling and undertaking special tasks to reconcile conflicts between other states 
or group of states’ (Holsti, 1970:265), Turkey’s attempts to reconcile the strained relations 
between Iran and 5+1 (permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) 
countries, Davutoğlu’s personal efforts to manage the conflict between Syria and Israel prior 
to 2010, intense diplomatic moves carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the 
conflict between Georgia and Russia and the attempts to embrace a mediator role between 
Assad regime and Western powers  in the aftermath of the Arab Spring fall into this category  
So far, the multiple role conceptions of AKP’s leading cadres have been examined to 
demonstrate the domestic self-constructed motives of Turkey concerning the Middle East. 
Yet, for a comprehensive analysis, the role prescriptions or expectations of external actors 
should also be scrutinized to understand the international roots of Turkish activism in the 
Middle East. Such an analysis will demonstrate to what extent the role prescriptions of 
external actors are overlapping or diverging with the Turkish foreign policy elite’s own 
national role conceptions. 
 
 
EXTERNAL ACTORS’ ROLE PRESCRIPTIONS FOR TURKEY 
 
Turkey’s increasing activism in the Middle East cannot be reduced to the self-constructed 
role conceptions of the AKP’s echelons, or to the cultural, historical or political 
characteristics of Turkey. Rather, the international context also influences this process. The 





ideas, norms and values generated by the international society, as well as the conjunctural 
developments and expectations of other actors, should also be considered in order to grasp 
the external roots of Turkey’s national role conceptions and related activism in the Middle 
East. While the conjunctural developments that forced Turkey to focus its attention on the 
Middle East are mainly Russian and EU policies, as well as the unprecedented Arab Spring, 
the role prescriptions of external others that coincided with Turkey’s national role 
conceptions are model and mediator roles.  
Turkey’s increasing dependency on Russia’s energy resources and Moscow’s swift 
recovery after the war in Chechnya have determined the limits of Turkish activism, both in 
the Caucasus and in Central Asia. Meanwhile, the EU’s emergence as a soft power in the 
Balkans diminished Turkey’s role in the region, while governmental changes in France and 
Germany resulted in the emergence of reluctant behaviour towards Turkey’s EU membership. 
Under these circumstances, the Middle East remained as the only area that the Turkish 
foreign policy elites could concentrate on. Finally, yet importantly, the Arab Spring also 
impelled Turkey to reconsider its national role conceptions in the sense that the zeitgeist for 
liberty has created its own policy requirements for Turkey in the Middle East. These 
international and regional contexts also generated new role prescriptions for Turkey, and 
decoding these role prescriptions is essential for finding out to what extent the expectations 
of others have influenced Turkey’s activism in the Middle East. 
The September 11 attacks and the US’s quest to formulate new policies in order to cope 
with radical Islam in the Middle East have produced a role prescription for Turkey, which is 
called the ‘Turkish model for the Arab-Muslim World’. Within this context, Turkey was 
introduced and promoted as a model to be emulated in a reactionary environment against 
Western involvement and values. In fact, such a role prescription was not new, and similar 
concerns about the role that Turkey was expected to perform appeared among political and 
intellectual circles after the demise of the Soviet Union.10 In this regard, whether Turkey 
could be a model for the peaceful transitions in Central Asia and Caucasia had become a 
central theme in the foreign policy agendas of the US and Turkey during the early 1990s. 
While Turkey failed to perform its expected model role in the 1990s, the Arab Spring has 
renewed the debates about the applicability of the Turkish model this time for the Middle 
East. Thus, together with Turkey’s self-constructed role conceptions for the region, the seeds 
of Turkish activism in the Middle East were planted by the continuous calls for a Turkish 
model made by the external actors. As it is previously mentioned, the model role has been 
embraced by Turkey with a careful modification as ‘source of inspiration’. 
Though a deconstruction of the Turkish model is beyond the scope of this essay, it is 
worth mentioning that its main pillars were the peaceful co-existence of Islamic and secular 
value systems, and its commitment to neo-liberal economic policies (Kirişçi, 2011:34). 
Admitting the peculiarity of the so called Turkish model, Altunışık (2005:47) argues that, the 
essentials of Turkish model are the country’s experience of secularism, democratization and 
international influences that are still significant in the political structure of Turkey.    
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, such a role expectation was first voiced by 
the US, as Paul Wolfowitz (2002), then US Deputy Defence Secretary underlined Turkey’s 
uniqueness as a country that managed to reconcile Islam and democratic values. In the 
following excerpt, he points out the components of the Turkish model: 
                                                          
10 For a comprehensive analysis on the Turkish model during the early 1990s, see Şule Kut Sule Kut 
(2002:5-12). 
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Modern Turkey demonstrates that a democratic system is indeed compatible with 
Islam… Turkey’s success can demonstrate to the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims that 
there is a far better path than the path of destruction and despair offered by the 
terrorists and demonstrate that the benefits of free and prosperous and open societies 
are available equally to Muslims as to everyone. 
 
Wolfowitz’s call for a Turkish model in the Middle East took on a new meaning with the 
establishment of the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) in 2003, which later turned into 
the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENAI) in 2004. The initiative was 
based on the promulgation of a neo-liberal value system in the Middle East, with Turkey’s 
task as a co-president country being to promote ‘women’s rights and democratization’ 
(Akman, 2011). Within the GMEI, Turkey was expected to perform a model role that could 
inspire other Muslim states in the region, and such a role prescription found considerable 
resonance among Turkish foreign policy elites (Bağcı and Sinkaya, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
initiative remained idle because of the US intervention in Iraq and Turkey’s subsequent 
rejection of a parliamentary bill allowing the deployment of US troops on Turkish territory. 
The calls for a Turkish model were renewed within a couple of years, and such a project 
became a matter of debate within both Western and Arab-Muslim political circles, especially 
after the outbreak of the Arab Spring. In fact, the Obama administration paid much more 
attention to introduce Turkey as a model than had any other previous governments. Obama’s 
visit to Turkey on April 6-7, 2009 was his first international presidential visit to a Muslim 
state. This visit not only demonstrated the importance that the new administration attached to 
Turkey but also conveyed Obama’s messages regarding US concerns about Islam and 
Turkey’s role in the Middle East:  
 
I think where there’s the most promise is in the idea that Turkey and the United States can build 
a model partnership in which a majority Christian and a majority Muslim nation, a Western 
nation and a nation that straddles two continents - that we can create a modern international 
community that is respectful, secure and prosperous. This is extremely important. One of the 
strengths of the US is that we have a Christian population, but we feel ourselves a nation of 
citizens. Modern Turkey was built on similar values as a secular country respecting religious 
freedom, rule of law and all freedoms. We are going to deliver this message to the world 
(Today’s Zaman, 2009). 
 
Similarly, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that Turkey’s outstanding economic 
performance together with its democratic political system could inspire the people in the 
Arab-Muslim world who were seeking reforms (The Guardian, 2011). 
French President Nicholas Sarkozy has also generated role prescriptions for Turkey. In an 
interview with Turkish journalist and columnist Mehmet Ali Birand, Sarkozy, while 
reaffirming his stance against Turkey’s EU membership, addressed the significance of 
Turkey in the emerging Middle Eastern political scheme. For him, instead of insisting on EU 
membership, Turkey should give priority to the Middle East, since no other country in the 
region could perform such an instrumental role in assisting the transformation of the region 
(Birand, 2011). 
Turkey’s intriguing economic performance and its commitment to liberal values did not 
only evoke admiration among the Western governments that are trying to cope with 
economic recession, but also made the country a source of inspiration that many Arab-





Muslim elites have gravitated towards. Rasheed Al Gannushi, one of the most prominent 
figures of the Tunisian opposition, and leader of Ennahda Party, was amongst the first who 
declared Turkey as a model for Tunisia in terms of its democracy (Anadolu Agency, 2011). 
Similarly, Morocco’s new Prime Minister Abdullah Benkirane stated that they admired the 
‘Turkish model of secular Islam’ (Sunday’s Zaman, 2011). The Turkish experience of 
democracy and liberal economy also impressed Mustafa Abdul Jalil, the leader of Libya's 
National Transitional Council (NTC). In an interview with Anatolian News Agency, he 
stated, ‘Turkey's democratic structure is an example to Libya and the other countries that 
experienced the Arab Spring. Libya will look to Turkey as a model for its own political and 
democratic structure’ (Today’s Zaman, 2012a). 
The Middle Eastern reformists’ admiration of the Turkish model brings out a question on 
Turkey’s role as an example or as a model. What makes Turkey so attractive for the 
opposition movements in the Middle East? According to Paul Salem, the director of the 
Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, the answer is that: 
 
They do not look at Saudi Arabia as an attractive model; they do not look to Taliban or al-
Qaeda. This movement is coming to power after people have seen the extremists and made a 
judgment about it... Turkey is the only real democracy in the entire Middle East. People are 
impressed that the AKP found a balance between cultural issues like faith, religion, nationalism 
and globalism...and obviously the economy. It is the only rapidly growing non-oil economy in 
the region (Yinanç, 2011). 
 
Together with the model role, Turkey’s role as a mediator has also been encouraged by the 
Western world. The country’s Muslim-liberal profile was seen as an asset by the Western 
powers and these role prescriptions coincided with Turkish foreign policy elite’s self-
constructed mediator role (Al Arabiya News, 2010). 
No matter how they are defined, the role prescriptions of external others seem to have 
influenced Turkey’s national role conceptions to the same degree as the Turkish foreign 
policy elite’s description of national self. In this regard, the policy requirements of the 
external others’ role prescriptions did not only justify, but also paved the way for Turkish 
activism in the Middle East. 
The foreign policy elite’s inclinations to present Turkey as a source of inspiration, and 
the external others’ generation of the model and mediator roles for Turkey, required the 
adaptation of certain patterns of foreign policy behaviour. In this regard, Turkish 
businesspersons’ efforts to increase trade flow between Turkey and the Middle Eastern 
countries, the reform recipes suggested by Turkish foreign policy elites at regional 
multilateral platforms such as the OIC, Turkey’s participation in military operations against 
the Qaddafi regime, its increasing engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and its 
conduct of muscular diplomacy towards Syria, are all the role performances that might be 
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OUTCOMES OF TURKEY’S ROLE PERFORMANCES 
 
So far, Turkey’s activism in the Middle East has been examined from the perspective of 
role theory. Yet, there are still certain pertinent questions that need to be addressed. What are 
the achievements and failures of Turkey’s new role performances? Is such activism likely to 
produce the expected outcomes for Turkey or destined to failure in the post-Arab Spring 
context?  
In terms of economic indicators, Turkish activism in the Middle East has produced the 
expected outcomes for Turkey. The following table demonstrates the balance of trade 
between Turkey and selected Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states between 
2003 and 2010, when AKP was in power (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2011). 
The balance of trade against Turkey’s favour in its trade with Saudi Arabia, Iran and 
Algeria can be related to Turkey’s dependency on oil and related products such as LPG, 
LNC, petroleum and natural gas. Even though the economic indicators given above 
demonstrate that Turkey has achieved its objective of increasing trade with the MENA 
region, it can still be argued that such an achievement is mainly context dependent and 
vulnerable to political crises. Decreasing trade flows between Turkey and Syria after Turkey 
adopted a hawkish stance on Assad’s repression of the Syrian opposition exemplifies the 
vulnerability of trade relations. Whereas Turkey’s monthly exports to Syria in January 2011 
were worth about 116,888,070 USD, they had sharply decreased to 65,364,120 USD in  
 
Table 1. Balance of Trade between Turkey and Middle Eastern and North African States 
Balance of Trade  
000 US Dollars 
(in Turkey’s Favour) 
 
2003 2006 2010 
EGYPT 156,382 316,829 1,324,101 
TUNISIA 121,875 174,799 432,911 
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 589,311 1,633,412 2,634,465 
LIBYA -817,807 -1,808,090 1,506,718 
IRAQ 716,457 2,213,416 4,681,782 
SYRIA -2,594 422,167 1,181,954 
LEBANON 76,416 113,914 389,782 
JORDAN 132,767 312,341 528,884 
PALESTINE 6,035 20,653 39,729 
BAHRAIN 13,683 -9,549 100,342 
KUWAIT 150,022 162,978 180,537 
OMAN 21,191 68,888 89,846 
YEMEN 155,959 197,430 329,348 
ALGERIA -508,584 -843,830 -771,428 
IRAN -1,326,897 -4,559,709 -4,600,831 
SAUDI ARABIA -645,348 -1,268,912 -219,511 





December 2011 and 63,122,470 USD in February 2012 (Turkish Exporters Assembly, 2012). 
The most remarkable political outcome of Turkish activism is Prime Minister Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s popularity in the Arab streets. Turkey’s new role performances as regional 
protector and defender of Islam have enabled Erdoğan and Davutoğlu to win the hearts and 
minds of the Arab people. According to a public opinion poll in 2010 in Arab states, Erdoğan 
emerged as the most admired leader in the Middle East (Telhami, 2010). 
On the other hand, Turkey’s new role performances also resulted in deterioration of its 
relations with Israel, Syria and Iran that sparked debates on the fate of ‘zero problem policy 
with the neighbours’. According to Steven Cook (2011), Davutoğlu’s ‘zero problem policy 
with the neighbours’ proved to be unsuccessful as far as Turkey’s turbulent relations with 
Iran, Syria, Armenia, Cyprus and the EU are concerned. Similarly Bülent Ali Rıza and 
Stephen Flanagan (2012:28) argue that, the recent crisis between Ankara and Damascus may 
have a spill over effect that can strain Turkey’s relations with Iran and Russia. Another critic 
of AKP’s foreign policy, Soner Cağaptay (2012) underlines the potential risks of Turkey’s 
over engagement in Syria as follows:  
 
Should al-Assad continue to reign despite Erdoğan’s outspoken support for regime change, this 
will tarnish the Turkish leader’s image as the tough guy who gets things done, the very image 
that has earned him respect and helped him win three successive elections since 2002. 
 
He would also be weakened with the PKK thriving in Syria and using its territory as a 
springboard to launch attacks against Turkey. Then he would most certainly ask Obama to 
prove whether he is truly the friend that the Turkish leader thinks he is. 
 
Under the spotlight of the above mentioned critics, the negative impacts of Turkish 
activism can be examined in terms of Turkey’s bilateral relations with Israel, Syria and Iran. 
First, whatever the motivation, Turkey’s attempts to adopt simultaneously the roles of 
regional leader, regional protector and defender of Islam culminated in a confrontation with 
Israel. Until the mid 2000s, Israel and Turkey, with their shared commitment to democracy 
and liberal economy, were performing similar roles in the Middle East. As outsiders to the 
region, they both represented the Western value system and such an overlap in their own 
national role conceptions made Turkey and Israel strategic partners. Soon after, however, 
Turkey realized that the policy requirements of regional protector, regional leader and 
defender of Islam roles were incompatible with the requirements of Turkish-Israeli 
partnership. As a result, Turkey gradually distanced itself from Israel. 
Second, Turkey’s adaptation of liberalizer role has created a conflict between Ankara and 
Damascus. After 1999, despite the pressures imposed by the US, Turkey maintained its 
friendly relations with Syria and made further attempts to integrate Syria with regional and 
global economic systems. The early achievements of Turkish-Syrian rapprochement were 
skyrocketing trade volumes, cooperation against terrorism and the elimination of visa 
requirements. Until 2011, Turkey refrained from participating in any international effort that 
aimed to punish the Assad regime. However, the Arab Spring forced Turkey to be more 
active as both a regional leader and liberalizer. In this sense, Turkey began to criticize Bashar 
Assad’s methods to suppress the opposition movement in Syria and a severe crisis broke out. 
The strained relations between the two countries culminated in a refugee influx into Turkish 
territory, and recently with Syrian attack on a Turkish fighter plane.  
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Third, Turkey’s relations with Iran were damaged because of Turkey’s decision to host a 
NATO radar system for defensive purposes. Despite President Gül’s statement underlining 
that the ‘NATO radar system is not against Iran’ (Hürriyet Daily News, 2012), such a 
decision elicited severe criticism from Tehran. If Turkey’s need to maintain deterrence vis-à-
vis a nuclear Iran is considered, the radar station in Malatya is likely to escalate the tension 
between the two countries in the near future. On the other hand, Turkey’s appearance as a 
role model for Arab-Muslim states may also create a new tension between Ankara and 
Tehran, who see themselves as potential rivals for regional leadership. In this regard, the 
claim of Ali Akbar Valayati, former Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs and current advisor 
on International Affairs to the Supreme Leader that the Turkish model is ‘unacceptable for 
the countries that are going through an Islamic awakening’ (Dombey and Bozogmehr, 2011) 
can be considered as an early signal of a further deterioration of relations. The crisis between 
the two countries is likely to intensify after Tayyip Erdoğan’s criticism of Iranian proposal 
for Baghdad and China instead of Istanbul, as possible venues for the next round of nuclear 





Turkey’s embrace of a new identity under AKP, necessitated reformulation of its foreign 
policy principles as well as the way of handling the issues on foreign policy agenda. The 
questions of “who we are?” and “how are we perceived by others?” triggered the identity 
transformation in domestic politics and had inevitable consequences in the foreign policy 
domain. On the one hand, the new Turkish identity justified particular foreign policy 
preferences. On the other hand, it made Kemalist envisioning and principles as “intuitively 
implausible, categorically excluded them as wrong or unacceptable, or made them 
unthinkable’ (Krotz, 2002:8).  
Turkey’s posture in the Middle East, different from the previous periods, is now 
composed of regional leader, regional protector, defender of Islam, bridge, model, mediator 
and liberalizer roles. These roles are mainly the products of AKP echelons’ self conceptions 
together with the feedbacks taken from external others. 
  Despite its nascent democracy, fragile economy and unresolved Kurdish issue, Turkey 
still inspires the people in the Middle East to push further for reforms. The early 
achievements of Turkish activism demonstrate that Turkey’s adoption of new foreign policy 
roles has found resonance on the Arab streets. However, in terms of regional politics, 
Turkey’s ambition to become a regional leader may culminate in crises with one or more of 
Iran, Syria and Israel. Nevertheless, no matter what kind of consequences Turkish activism 
may produce, it is easy to anticipate that Turkey’s imprint on the new political landscape of 
the Middle East will become even more prominent in the near future. 
 





Aggestam, Lisbeth. 2006. “Role Theory and European Foreign Policy: A Framework for 
Analysis.” In The European Union’s Roles in International Politics, edited by Ole 





Elgström and Michael Smith, 11-29. London: Routledge. 
Akder, Salih. 1987. “Turkey’s Exports Expansion in the Middle East, 1980-1985.” The 
Middle East Journal 41(4):553-567.  
Akman, Nuriye. 2011. “PM Tayyip Erdoğan: No One Can Stand against the People’s Will.” 
 Today’s Zaman, February 4. Accessed February 28, 2011. http://www.todayszaman. 
com/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=234447.  
Aksoy, Murat. 2011. “Ömer Çelik’le Röpörtaj (Interview with Ömer Çelik).” Yeni Şafak, 
 September 12. Accessed September 26, 2011. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Roportaj/Def 
 ault.aspx?i=340313.  
Aktay, Yasin. 2010. “Politics At Home, Politics in the World: The Return of the Political in 
 Turkish Foreign Policy.” Mediterranean Quarterly 21(1):61-75. 
Al Arabiya News. 2010. “US Hails Turkey Mediation of Iran Nuke Standoff.” 21 April. 
Accessed April 25, 2012. http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/04/21/106452.html. 
Ali Rıza, Bülent and Stephen Flanagan. 2012. “The End of Zero Problems? Turkey and 
 Shifting Regional Dynamics.” In 2012 Global Forecast: Risk, Opportunity and the 
 Next Administration, edited by Craig Cohen and Josiane Gabel, 28-30. Washington 
 D.C: Center for Strategic and International Studies.  
Altunışık, Meliha Benli. 2005. “The Turkish Model and Democratization of the Middle 
East.” Arab Studies Quarterly 27(1-2):45-63. 
Anadolu Agency. 2011. “Gannushi Wants a National Unity Government.” 27 October. 
 Accessed December 8, 2011. http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/17315--gannushi-
wants-a-national-unity-government. 
Aral, Berdal. 2001. “Dispensing with Tradition? Turkish Politics and International Society 
 during the Özal Decade, 1983-1993.” Middle Eastern Studies 37(1):72-88.  
Aras, Bülent. 2009. “The Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy.” Insight Turkey 
 11(3):127-142. 
Aras, Bülent and Aylin Görener. 2010. “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policy 
 Orientation: The Ideational Bases of the Justice and Development Party's Foreign 
 Policy Activism in the Middle East.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 
 12(1):73-92. 
Bağcı, Hüseyin and Bayram Sinkaya. 2007. “The Greater Middle East Initiative and Turkey: 
 The AKP’s Perspective.” In The Importance of Being European, Turkey, the EU 
and the Middle East, edited by Nimrod Goren and Amikam Nachmani, 165-177. 
 Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
Bengtsson, Rikard and Ole Elgstörm. 2012. “Conflicting Role Conceptions? The European 
 Union in World Politics.” Foreign Policy Analysis 8(1):93-108.   
Birand, Mehmet Ali. 2011. “Sarkozy’den Birand’a Çarpıcı Açıklamalar (Astonishing 
 Claims from Sarkozy - Interview with French President Nicholas Sarkozy).” 
February 24. Accessed March 12, 2012. http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/ 
02/24/sarkozyden.biranda.carpici.aciklamalar/608058.0/index.html. 
Boland, Vincent and Daniel Dombey. 2005. “EU without Turkey will be just a Christian 
 Club.” Financial Times, October 3. Accessed December 21, 2012. http://ww 
 w.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ca926e4e-33a9-11da-bd49-00000e2511c8.html.  
Bozdağlıoğlu, Yücel. 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist 
 Approach. New York: Routledge.  
Breuning, Marijke. 2011. “Role Theory Research in International Relations: State of the Art 
 and Blind Spots. In Role Theory in International Relations, Approaches and 
 ŞEVKET OVALI 18 
 
Analyses, edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Frank Cornelia and Hans W. Maull, 16-35. 
New York: Routledge. 
Cantır, Cristian and Juliet Kaarbo. 2012. “Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: 
 Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory.” Foreign 
 Policy Analysis 8(1):5-24.  
Cook, Steven. 2011. “From Zero Problems to Cok Problems.” Council on Foreign Relations, 
 November 17. Accessed November 29, 2012. http://blogs.cfr.org/cook/2011/11/17/ 
turkey-from-zero-problems-to-cok-problems/?cid=oth_partner_site-atlantic. 
Çağaptay, Soner. 2012. “Will Turkey Force Obama’s Hand on Syria?” CNN World, June 14. 
 Accessed November 29, 2012. http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/14/ 
will-turkey-force-obamas-hand-on-syria/.  
Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2008. “Turkey’s Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007.” Insight 
 Turkey 10(1):77-96.  
Davutoğlu, Ahmet. 2009. Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth). Istanbul: Küre Yayınları. 
Dombey, Daniel and Najmeh Bozorgmehr. 2011. “Iran Criticizes Turkey’s Secular Islam.” 
 Financial Times, December 13. Accessed December 27, 2011. http://www.ft.com/ 
intl/cms/s/0/75843e66-259f-11e1-9c76-00144feabdc0.html. 
Dumont, Paul. 1984. “The Origins of Kemalist Ideology.” In Atatürk and the Modernization 
 of Turkey, edited by Jacob M. Landau. 25-44. Boulder & Leiden: Westview Press & 
 E.J. Brill. 
Fırat, Melek and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. 2003. “Orta Doğu’yla İlişkiler.” In Türk Dış Politikası: 
 Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt 1: 1919-1980, 
edited by Baskın Oran, 784-808. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.    
Grossman, Michael. 2005. “Role Theory and Foreign Policy Change: The Transformation of 
 Russian Foreign Policy in the 1990s.” International Politics 42(3):334-351. 
Gürsel, Kadri. 2011. “Davutoğlu: Model Olma İddiamız Yok (We do not have a claim to be 
a model for the Middle East).” Milliyet, March 2. Accessed April 20, 2012. 
http://dunya.milliyet.com.tr/davutoglu-model-olma-iddiamiz-yok/kadri-gursel/dunya/ 
dunyayazardetay/03.03.2011/1359203/default.htm. 
Harnisch, Sebastian. 2011. “Role Theory: Operationalization of Key Concepts.” In Role 
 Theory in International Relations, Approaches and Analyses, edited by Sebastian 
 Harnisch, Frank Cornelia and Hans W. Maull, 7-15. New York: Routledge. 
Harnisch, Sebastian. 2012. “Conceptualizing in the Minefield: Role Theory and Foreign 
 Policy Learning.” Foreign Policy Analysis 8(1):47-69. 
Herrmann, Richard K. 1985. Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy. Pittsburgh: 
 University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Hermann, Richard K. 1986. “The Power of Perceptions in Foreign-Policy Decision Making: 
 Do Views of the Soviet Union Determine the Policy Choices of American 
Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 30:841-875. 
Holsti, Kalevi J. 1970. “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.” 
 International Studies Quarterly 14(3):233-309. 
Hopf, Ted. 2002. The Social Construction of International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Hudson, Valerie. M. 2005. “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground 
 of International Relations.” Foreign Policy Analysis, 1(1): 1-30. 
Hürriyet Daily News. 2011.  “EU Becoming ‘Christian Club’ Turkish Minister Says at Davos 
 Forum.” 29 January. Accessed February 12, 2012. http://www.hurriyetdailynews. 







Hürriyet Daily News. 2012, “Gül: Religious-based Politics will Harm Faith.” 14 March. 
 Accessed April 20, 2012. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/gul-religious-based-
 politics-harm-faith.aspx?pageID=238&nID=16043&NewsCatID=338.  
Justice and Development Party Press Release. 2012. “İnsanlık İçin Fikir Üretemeyen, Milleti 
 İçin de Üretemez (A person who cannot produce ideas for humanity cannot also 
 produce ideas for his/her own nation).” Accessed May 24, 2012. http://www.akpar 
 ti.org.tr/site/haberler/insanlik-icin-fikir-uretemeyen-milleti-icin-de-uretemez/21305.   
Kaarbo, Juliet. 2003. “Foreign Policy Analysis in the Twenty-First Century: Back to 
 Comparison, Forward to Identity and Ideas.” International Studies Review 5(2):156-
 163. 
Kardaş, Şaban.  2010. “Turkey: Redrawing the Middle East Map or Building Sandcastles?” 
 Middle East Policy 17(1):115-136. 
Kirişçi, Kemal. 2011. “Turkey’s ‘Demonstrative Effect’ and the Transformation of the 
Middle  East.” Insight Turkey 13(2):33-55. 
Krotz, Ulrich. 2002. “National Role Conceptions and Foreign Policies: France and Germany 
 Compared.” Program for the Study of Germany and Europe - Working Paper, no. 
02.1. Accessed February 28, 2012. http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/ 
docs/pdfs/Krotz.pdf. 
Kut, Şule. 2002. “The Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s.” In Turkey in World 
 Politics, an Emerging Multiregional Power, edited by Barry Rubin and Kemal 
Kirişçi. 5-12. Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press.  
Laçiner, Sedat. 2003. “Özalism (Neo-Ottomanism): An Alternative in Turkish Foreign 
 Policy?” Journal of Administrative Sciences 1(1-2):161-202. 
Liel, Alon. 2001. Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam and Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
 Publications.   
MacLeod, Scott. 2011. “Interview with Davutoğlu: Strategic Thinking.” UAC Cairo Review. 
 July 2. Accessed August 28, 2011. http://www.aucegypt.edu/gapp/cairoreview/ 
Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=143. 
Murison, Alexander. 2006. “The Strategic Depth Doctrine in Turkish Foreign Policy.” 
Middle  Eastern Studies 42(6):945-964. 
Ovalı, Şevket. 2012. “Revisiting the Turkish Identity Debate in Turkish Israeli Relations.” 
 Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 35(4):28-54.  
Özcan, Gencer. 2005. Türkiye-İsrail İlişkilerinde Dönüşüm: Güvenliğin Ötesi. İstanbul: 
 TESEV Dış Politika Analiz Serisi 1.  
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Press Release. 2003a. “Foreign Minister Abdullah 
 Gül’s Speech at the Meeting of the foreign ministers of the Organization of the 
Islamic  Conference.” Tehran, May 28. Accessed June 6, 2012. http://www.tccb.gov. 
tr/sayfa/konusmaaciklama_mesajlar/kitap/62.pdf. 
Presidency of the Republic of Turkey Press Release. 2003b. “Foreign Minister Abdullah 
 Gül’s Speech at the Meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations.” Ankara, June 9. 
 Accessed June 6, 2012. http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/konusmaaciklamamesajlar/ 
kitap/80.pdf. 
Radikal. 2008. “Batının Ahlaksızlığını Aldık (We Did Not Transfer the Science of the West 
 but Its Immorality).” January 25. Accessed May 22, 2012. http://www.radikal.com. 
tr/haber.php?haberno=245471. 
 ŞEVKET OVALI 20 
 
Radikal. 2011. “Başbakan Erdoğan: Laiklikten korkmayın (Don’t be afraid from 
secularism).” September 14. Accessed May 28, 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/ 
Radikal.aspx?aTye=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=1063365&CategoryID=81. 
Sekhri, Sofiane. 2009.  “The Role Approach as a Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of 
 Third World Countries.” African Journal of Political Science and International 
 Relations 3(10):423-432. 
Sunday’s Zaman. 2011. “Morocco’s New Prime Minister Looks to ‘Turkish Model’ for New 
 Government.” 1 December. Accessed April 20, 2012. http://www.todayszaman. 
com/news-264487-moroccos-new-pm-looks-to-turkish-model-for-new-government. 
html. 
Telhami, Shibley. 2010. “Arab Public Opinion Poll.” University of Maryland and Zogby 
 International August 5. Accessed March 15, 2012. http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/Files/rc/reports/2010/08arabopinionpolltelhami/08arabopinionpolltelhami.pdf.  
The Guardian [UK Edition]. 2011. “Clinton Eyes Turkey as Model for Arab Reform.” 16 
July. Accessed August 21, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/ 
9747131. 
Thies, Cameron. G. 2009. “Role Theory and Foreign Policy.” International Studies 
 Association Compendium Project Foreign Policy Analysis Section. Accessed June 
21, 2012.  http://www.isanet.org/compendiumsections/2007/06/foreignpolicy.html.  
Thies, Cameron. G. 2010. “State Socialization and Structural Realism.” Security Studies 
19(4):689-717. 
Today’s Zaman. 2009. “Obama Declares Turkey Model Partner of Values.” 7 April. 
Accessed March 26, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetailgetNewsBy 
Id.action?load=detay&link=171722. 
Today’s Zaman. 2011. “Erdoğan Says ‘Syria’s Glorious Resistance Will Succeed.” 1 
 November. Accessed April 24, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/ newsDetailget 
NewsById.action?newsId=261588. 
Today’s Zaman. 2012a. “Libya’s Transitional Council Calls Turkey Model for Arab Spring 
 Countries.” 13 February. Accessed April 20, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/ 
news-271297-libyas-transitional-council-calls-turkey-model-for-arab-spring-countries. 
html. 
Today’s Zaman. 2012b. “Turkish Prime Minister Says Iran Not Honest in Nuclear Talks.” 5 
April. Accessed May 17, 2012. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-276541-turkey
 says-iran-not-honest-in-nuclear-talks.html. 
Turkish Exporters Assembly Web Site. 2012. “Export Figures.”Accessed June 17, 2012.  
http://www.tim.org.tr/tr/ihracat-ihracat-rakamlari-tablolar.html.  
Turkish Statistical Institute. 2011. Foreign Trade Statistics Year Book. Ankara: Turkish 
Statistical Institute Printing Division.  
UNOAC (United Nations Alliance of Civilizations). 2009. “Speech of Turkish Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.” Accessed May 21, 2012. http://www.unaoc.org/ 
images/erdogan%20forum%20speech%20(4).pdf. 
Walker, Stephen. 1987. “The Relevance of Role Theory to Foreign Policy Analysis.” In Role 
Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, edited by Stephen Walker, 1-4. Durham: 
DukeUniversity Press. 
Walker, Stephen. 1992. “Symbolic Interactionism and International Politics: Role Theory’s 
Contribution to International Organization.” In Contending Dramas: A Cognitive 





Approach to International Organization, edited by Martha Cottam and Chih-yu Shih, 
19-38. New York: Praeger. 
Weldes, Jutta. 1996. “Constructing National Interests.” European Journal of International 
Relations 2(3):275-318. 
Wish, Naomi Bailin. 1980. “Foreign Policy Makers and Their National Role Conceptions.”
 International Studies Quarterly 24(4):532-554. 
Wolfowitz, Paul. 2002. “Building Coalitions of Common Values.” Addressed by U.S Deputy
 Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz to the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies, December 2. Accessed May 12, 2012. http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-
addresses/wolfowitz-address/.   
Yeni Şafak. 2010. “Yahudilere Olduğu Gibi Filistin’e de Sahip Çıkıyoruz (We look after 
Palestine as we did it to Jews throughout our history).” June 13. Accessed February 
12, 2012. http://yenisafak.com.tr/Politika/?i=262633.  
Yinanç, Barçın. 2011. “Arab Wave Sweeps Iran Model Out, Turkey in (Interview with Paul 






























Şevket Ovalı, Assistant Professor of International Relations, Dokuz Eylul University Izmir - Turkey, 
Faculty of Business 243-B Tinaztepe Campus, 35370, Buca Izmir-Turkey, Tel: +90-232-412-8225, 
Email: sevketovali@deu.edu.tr. 
